The Peculiar Case of State v. Terry Lynn Nichols: Are Television Cameras Really Banned from Oklahoma Criminal Proceedings? by Nelon, Robert D.
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 
Volume 3 
Issue 1 Winter 2001 Article 1 
2001 
The Peculiar Case of State v. Terry Lynn Nichols: Are Television 
Cameras Really Banned from Oklahoma Criminal Proceedings? 
Robert D. Nelon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert D. Nelon, The Peculiar Case of State v. Terry Lynn Nichols: Are Television Cameras Really Banned 
from Oklahoma Criminal Proceedings?, 3 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 4 
(2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol3/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of 




The truck bomb rippd Into the AJ.P Mmrrht
by Building un April 19, 1995, at 9:02 a4m. One huniidred
Robert D. g m woi en, and ctdhildren died. None knew I
McVegh or 'erry Lynn Nichols, nor did McVeon and
Ne ion
of the Nichols trial. I feel like he needs to be tried before
an Oklahoma jury."2 Macy then put his words into action,
filing Oklahoma state charges against Nichols and seek-
ing the death penalty.
Nichols was brought to Oklahoma City from the feder-
al prison near Florence, Colorado, to be arraigned on
state charges on February 2, 2000. His arrival in
Oklahoma City occurred with little advance fanfare.
Nevertheless, two television stations in Oklahoma City-
KFOR-TV, an NBC affiliate, and KWTV, a CBS affili-
ate-quickly asked Associate District Judge Robert M.
Murphy, Jr. if they could put a television camera in the
courtroom to cover the arraignment. Judge Murphy
denied the request orally, but did not foreclose the possi-
bility that he would consider pool television coverage 3 for
later proceedings in the case.
On February 25, 2000, a consortium of electronic
media 4 filed a motion 5 asking permission to provide pool
television coverage of Nichols' preliminary hearing, then
scheduled for June 2000. The premise of the electronic
media's motion was that the First Amendment (as well as
the Oklahoma Constitution) made the courtroom in a
criminal case presumptively open to the public; that the
media, as the surrogates for the public, had a right to
attend criminal proceedings; that there was no justifiable
basis to permit access to print media while excluding
electronic media from access to the criminal proceeding;
and that restrictions on electronic media access 6 were
therefore unconstitutional. The motion of the electronic
media was supported by over 700 pages of exhibits, pri-
marily reports of studies in various states, including
California, Florida, and New York, on their experience
with television cameras in courtrooms. Nichols and the
State of Oklahoma each filed briefs opposing the elec-
tronic media's motion.
THE ARGUMENTS
The electronic media's argument began with the unre-
markable supposition that the state proceeding against
Nichols was of great interest to the public. Its brief sum-
marized:
What new evidence of guilt, if any, the State
will offer beyond that presented in the federal
trial; what new defenses, if any, the defendant
will raise; what creative or innovative trial
techniques will be employed by prosecution
and defense, are all questions of interest to the
public. Indeed, given the conviction of the
film/tv
defendant in federal court, the question of why
this proceeding is being conducted at all is
very much on the public's mind .... 7
Next, the media petitioners observed that although
the arraignment had been open to the public, and the
press had attended and reported second-hand what had
transpired, no audio-visual medium had been present.
According to petitioners, "The general public knew only
what those few who could attend the arraignment told
them had happened. They had no way to see for them-
selves. ' '8 That would continue, they argued, because only
a few members of the public would be able to attend the
subsequent proceedings, which were being conducted in
a make-shift courtroom in the basement of the Oklahoma
County Jail capable of accommodating only about fifty
spectators. "Without cameras in the courtroom," the
media concluded, "the public will see at best only pictures
of the outside of the building where proceedings are con-
ducted, or 'sound bites' from out-of-court interviews of
observers, sometimes out of context, rather than actual
excerpts of the proceedings (let alone possibly full cover-
age). That should not be."9
In support of its position, the electronic media pre-
sented the argument that at least since Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 10 judicial proceedings, espe-
cially criminal cases, have been presumptively open. 11
The Supreme Court has held that access can be limited
or denied only by narrowly tailored restrictions neces-
sary to protect a fundamental or compelling interest.12 It
follows, the electronic media argued, that keeping pro-
ceedings open to the public, in this day and time, means
more than affording access "only to those who can
squeeze in the door."1 3 Since most people do not have the
time and resources to attend criminal proceedings in per-
son, they rely almost exclusively on the media to advise
them of what is going on in their public courtrooms. In
the words of the petitioners, "Acting as the 'eyes and ears
of the public,' the media play a significant role in bring-
ing information about judicial proceedings to the public
at large. Thus, because 'people now acquire [information
about trials] chiefly through the print and electronic
media,' the media function as 'surrogates for the pub-
lic.' 14 The argument continued:
[I]f the press is presumed to have a right to
attend a judicial proceeding, there is no justifi-
cation-absent clearly articulated and com-
pelling reasons-for permitting some members
of the press (print reporters) to attend and use
R BE r- [
the tools of their trade to report the proceed-
ings, but permitting other members of the
press (broadcast reporters) only to attend, and
prohibiting them from using the tools or their
trade to report the proceedings. '[I]f the print
media, with its pens, pencils, and notepads,
have a right of access to a criminal trial, then
the electronic media, with its cameras, must
be given equal access too.' Stated another way,
'in the context of the right of press access to
the courtroom, there can no longer be a mean-
ingful distinction between the print press and
the electronic media.'
15
Furthermore, the petitioners said, the premise that it
is unfair, if not unconstitutional, to restrict electronic
reporting of court proceedings while permitting print
reporting of the same pro-
ceedings is not a novel one.
Citing the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals' hold-
ing in Lyles v. State 16 that
"to deny television the
same privileges as are
granted to the press would
constitute unwarranted
discrimination,"17 the
media argued that prece-
dent permitting electronic
broadcasting of criminal
proceedings was clearly in
its favor.
However, "the common-
sense wisdom of Lyles, let
alone the mandate of
Richmond Newspapers," the electronic media lamented,
"does not seem to prevail today in Oklahoma. One com-
ponent of the media-television news-is hamstrung in
its efforts to be the 'eyes and ears,' the multi-sensory sur-
rogate, of the public in reporting about judicial proceed-
ings"1 8 because of Canon 3(B)(9) of the Oklahoma Code of
Judicial Conduct. 19 According to Canon 3(B)(9), any type
of electronic broadcasting requires not only the permis-
sion of the judge, but also that of virtually any other
party that could become a subject of the broadcast-
including witnesses, jurors, and of course, the defendant.
In order to broadcast in compliance with the Code, there-
fore, a radio or television station would have to get con-
sent from all such parties.
).N ~
Predictably, Terry Nichols declined to consent to the
presence of electronic media at his preliminary hearing.
The electronic media contended that allowing such a
refusal improperly frustrated the First Amendment right
of the media to televise court proceedings where the
defendant cannot demonstrate any specific and com-
pelling risk to his rights. In petitioners' words:
Canon 3(B)(9) takes from the trial judge all the
judicial discretion-the delicate balancing of
the constitutional interests of the accused, the
public, and the press which Richmond
Newspapers requires him to exercise-and
gives to the defendant in a criminal case the
absolute power to veto the effective presence of
the electronic media. The defendant need not




the tools of her trade




that the public and
press have constitu-
tional interests as
well, and no matter
that the defendant's
constitutional inter-
ests would not be
impaired by the pres-
ence of a silent, unob-
trusive television
camera. The judge cannot give the public,
other than those actually physically present in
the courtroom, the ability to see justice at
work. The defendant is in control of the court-
room. 2 0
Addressing the obvious question, "How did this come
to be?" the media traced the ban on cameras in court-
rooms to the trial of Bruno Hauptmann, who was accused
and convicted of the kidnapping and murder of the son of
Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh. 2 1  From all
accounts, a circus atmosphere surrounded the
Hauptmann trial.22 Curious observers came from all
over the world to Flemington, New Jersey, where 500
spectators jammed a courtroom designed to hold 200.
The international press included 350 reporters and 130
cameramen. News and entertainment blurred as celebri-
ty commentators like Walter Winchell and Damon
Runyon, sports figures such as Jack Dempsey, and movie
stars like Ginger Rogers made cameo appearances.
Tourists attended to see both the trial and the celebrities.
Wires snaked across the floor from the courtroom to
empty rooms in the courthouse where telegraph and tele-
phone facilities were set up to enable correspondents to
file their stories quickly. Actors even performed the trial
participants' roles on radio daily and hidden cameras
provided film clips that were shown in movie theatres.
The excessive media coverage led the American Bar
Association in 1937 to recommend adoption of Canon 35
as an addition to the Canons of Professional and Judicial
Ethics. As proposed, Canon 35 stated:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with
fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of
photographs in the courtroom, during sessions
of the court or recesses between sessions, and
the broadcasting of court proceedings are cal-
culated to detract from the essential dignity of
the proceedings, degrade the court and create
misconceptions with respect thereto in the
mind of the public and should not be permit-
ted. 2
3
Though later labeled "an 'exaggerated response to an
exceptional situation' on the part of the organized legal
profession,"2 4 it was nevertheless adopted by a majority
of states, and later embodied, at least in spirit, in Rule 53
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In 1972, the ABA replaced the Canons of Judicial
Ethics with a Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3(A)(7) of
the new Code prohibited televising or broadcasting court
proceedings except under certain conditions, including
the consent of all parties and each witness. 2 5 In 1982,
the ABA modified Canon 3(A)(7) to prohibit televising or
broadcasting court proceedings unless electronic cover-
age was approved by a supervising appellate court or
other appropriate authority and the coverage was unob-
trusive, consistent with the fair trial rights of the parties,
and did not interfere with the administration of justice.2 6
Canon 3(A)(7) was eliminated by the ABA in 1990,
although the identical provision is now found as
Standard 8.3.8 of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on
Fair Trial and Free Press.2
7
Perhaps more importantly, versions of the original
Canon 35 still linger in several states. Adopted with
fim tv
slight modification in Oklahoma on September 30, 1959,
as part of the Canons of Ethics,2 8 Canon 35 remained
until the Canons of Ethics were withdrawn in 1975 by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court and replaced with the
Code of Judicial Conduct. 2 9 Even then, Canon 3(A)(7) of
the 1975 version of the Code of Judicial Conduct paral-
leled the first ABA Canon 3(A)(7). However, by order
dated October 25, 1978, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
withdrew Canon 3(A)(7) and substituted a new version
that took a somewhat more relaxed attitude toward cam-
eras in Oklahoma courtrooms. 30  Indeed, Oklahoma
engaged in an experimental program of television cover-
age of some judicial proceedings for several years begin-
ning on January 1, 1979. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
twice extended the experimental program, and eventual-
ly made the experimental coverage rules permanent. 3 1
But old rules lingered in criminal cases, where electron-
ic coverage of the proceedings was still prohibited with-
out the consent of the accused.
32
In 1997, the Oklahoma Supreme Court repealed the
1975 version of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
replaced it with the current version. 3 3 Canon 3(A)(7)
became Canon 3(B)(9), and the tone of the Canon revert-
ed to the more negative form: "Except as permitted by the
individual judge, the use of cameras, television or other
recording or broadcasting equipment is prohibited . .. ."
In other words, like its predecessors, Canon 3(B)(9) pro-
hibits the broadcast coverage of a criminal proceeding
without the consent of the accused.
The electronic media called Canon 3(B)(9) "irra-
tional.' '3 4 They argued there was no empirical evidence
that the presence of a television camera in the courtroom
would invariably detract from the proceedings or impair
the rights of the accused unless he consented. They cited
Chandler v. Florida, 35 which some twenty years before
had concluded that "at present no one has been able to
present empirical data sufficient to establish that the
mere presence of the broadcast media inherently has an
adverse effect on the [criminal judicial] process. '3 6 The
electronic media said that recent experiments with cam-
eras in courtrooms actually demonstrated that coverage
of court proceedings "has greatly enhanced public under-
standing of and confidence in the judiciary and has not
interfered with the administration of justice. '3 7 In par-
ticular, the petitioners cited studies in Alaska, Arizona,
California, Florida, and New York, and submitted
exhibits "reaffirm[ing] 25-years worth of cumulative
empirical evidence which points to only one conclusion:
ROBE RT D. N LON
It is now demonstrable, as a matter of fact, that there is
no 'reasonable likelihood' that the presence of an in-court
camera 'disparages the judicial process' and . . .that
cameras in the courtroom possess great social value."
3 8
For example, in New York, the chief administrative
judge reported to the governor and the legislature in
1989 that the presence of cameras in the courtroom had
not influenced the ultimate outcome of any New York
State trial during the period of the study. He recom-
mended that televised trials become a permanent fixture
of the legal system. 3 9 In May 1994, another committee
created at the direction of the New York legislature,
under the chairmanship of Judge Burton B. Roberts,
reported that televised proceedings increased public
respect for the judicial system, had no impact on the per-
formance of attorneys or witnesses, and had not adverse-
ly impacted any defendant's right to a fair trial.
40 The
New York State Committee to Review Audio Visual
Coverage of Court Proceedings, created by the New York
legislature in 1995, conducted yet another study of the
effect of cameras on judicial proceedings. That commit-
tee, headed by John D. Feerick, Dean of the Fordham
University Law School, issued its report in 1997.41 The
Feerick Report, like its predecessors, recommended that
cameras should be permitted in New York courts on a
permanent basis. The report concluded that cameras
enhanced public scrutiny of the judicial system, which
"works as a safeguard, not a threat, to the defendant's
rights."4 2 The Feerick Committee also found that most
judges felt that compared to similar cases covered only by
the print media, lawyers made about the same number of
motions, objections, and arguments in camera-covered
cases and presented about the same amount of evidence
and witnesses. Moreover, there was "ample testimony
and public comment that cameras raised some judge's
performance and had a positive impact on judicial
demeanor."
4 3
The California experience was similar. In 1980 and
1981, California performed an experiment with respect
to electronic coverage of court proceedings. The experi-
ment was summarized and evaluated in a detailed report
prepared by an independent consulting firm.
4 4
Participants reported little awareness of, and little dis-
traction caused by, the presence of cameras. Ninety per-
cent of the judges and attorneys surveyed said that the
presence of cameras did not interfere at all, or interfered
only slightly, with courtroom dignity and decorum. Most
judges and attorneys also agreed that camera coverage
did not affect the behavior of the various participants. As
a result of that report, California enacted a rule permit-
ting extensive coverage of criminal and civil trials.
While the 1984 report is among the more comprehen-
sive studies conducted on the perceived effects of tele-
vised trials, the California story did not end there. Three
weeks after the O.J. Simpson criminal trial concluded, a
special task force was appointed by the Chief Judge of
the California Supreme Court to evaluate the effects of
cameras in the courtroom. 4 5 Despite the intense opposi-
tion from some quarters, the task force concluded that
cameras should continue to remain in California's court-
rooms. It stated, "actual physical attendance [of the pub-
lic] at court proceedings is too difficult for the courts to
countenance a total removal of the public's principal
news source." 46 The task force found that judges who
actually had experience with cameras in their courts
plainly favored continued camera coverage of California
trials. Ninety-six percent of those judges reported that
the presence of a video camera did not affect the outcome
of the trial in any way.4 7 In addition, the overwhelming
majority reported that the camera did not affect their
ability to maintain courtroom order or control of proceed-
ings. 4 8
The electronic media conceded that there were
instances in which the presence of cameras had affected
the dignity of judicial proceedings or the outcome of the
case. They gave as an example Estes v. Texas, 4 9 a case
where the media coverage of the defendant's preliminary
hearing and, to a lesser extent, his trial, had denied his
rights of due process. At the preliminary hearing:
[A]t least 12 cameramen were engaged in the
courtroom ... taking motion and still pictures
and televising the proceedings. Cables and
wires were snaked across the courtroom floor,
three microphones were on the judge's bench
and others were beamed at the jury box and
counsel table. It is conceded that the activities
of the television crews and news photogra-
phers led to considerable disruption of the
hearings. 5 0
At one point, "the photographers were found attempting
to picture the page of the paper from which [the defen-
dant] was reading while seated at counsel table. ' 5 1 Press
coverage of the trial inside the courtroom was more sub-
dued, with concealed cameras intermittently filming only
small portions of the courtroom, but reporting about the
trial was nevertheless extensive.
However, the electronic media argued, "Estes did not
announce a constitutional rule that all photographic or
broadcast coverage of criminal trials is inherently a
denial of due process," 5 2 and in Chandler, the Court
declined to promulgate any such per se rule. Noting that
courts had devices available to them to prevent or cure
potential prejudice, the Court said:
An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast
coverage of trials cannot be justified simply
because there is a danger that, in some cases,
prejudicial broadcast accounts of pretrial and
trial events may impair the ability of jurors to
decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninflu-
enced by extraneous matter. The risk of juror
prejudice in some cases does not justify an
absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the
printed media; so also the risk of such preju-
dice does not warrant an absolute constitu-
tional ban on all broadcast coverage.
5 3
In arguing that Chandler recognized how changes in
technology had to be taken into account, 5 4 the media
petitioners echoed Justice Harlan's concurrence in Estes:
[T]he day may come when
television will have become
so commonplace an affair in
the daily life of the average
person as to dissipate all
reasonable likelihood that
its use in courtrooms may
disparage the judicial
process. If and when that
day arrives [the banning of
televised trials] would of
course be subject to re-examination. .... 55
"That day has come," the electronic media concluded. 5 6
They observed that Court TV has successfully televised
over 700 trials and other judicial proceedings all over the
world without disrupting the proceedings, impairing the
dignity of the courtroom or the judicial process, or invad-
ing the rights of the participants. They cited numerous
cases where courts in other jurisdictions had permitted
television coverage of judicial proceedings, many of them
gavel-to-gavel, finding the salutary effects of television
coverage to outweigh by far any speculative concerns of
prejudice to the proceedings. 5 7
According to the media, stationing a single, silent,
unobtrusive camera inside a courtroom, would enable
viewers to observe the proceedings as though they were
film/tv
in the courtroom. Such a camera would "permit citizens
to watch for themselves the moment-to-moment work of
the judicial process in action, . . . observ[ing] for them-
selves the demeanor, tone, cadence, contentiousness, and
perhaps even competency and veracity of the trial partic-
ipants. ' 58 Moreover, anticipating Nichols' arguments
that television coverage of the preliminary hearing would
create adverse pretrial publicity, the electronic media
asserted that it was unlikely that any television coverage
from the courtroom would result in pretrial publicity
greater in scope or degree than the print and electronic
coverage about the proceedings which would occur in any
event.5 9 Rather, seeing the proceedings first-hand would
be more accurate, informative, and less invasive of any-
one's interests than hearing about the proceedings
through the filter of a reporter's observations.
60
At the conclusion of their motion, the electronic media
asked the judge to declare Canon 3(B)(9) unconstitution-
al because:
[I]t divests the trial court of its constitutional
duty under Richmond Newspapers, Globe
Newspapers, Press-Enterprise I, and Press-
Enterprise II to balance the
respective interests of the
defendant, the public, and
the press, and to restrict
electronic and print coverage
of the proceedings only if
there is 'an overriding inter-
est based on findings that
closure is essential to pre-
serve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.' 6 1
The electronic media then argued that the Canon "is
clearly unconstitutional because it gives to the criminal
defendant the power-without need to explain-to veto
the use of the television in the courtroom, depriving the
electronic media and thereby the public at large . . .of
their First Amendment right of access to the court-
room."
6 2
Both Nichols and the State of Oklahoma opposed the
electronic media's motion.6 3 Nichols' opposition was pre-
dictably both legal and tactical. 6 4 He argued that Canon
3(B)(9) was binding on the court, and suggested that the
trial judge could face disciplinary action if he failed to
abide by it.65 He then argued in favor of the Canon's con-
stitutionality, saying that "while the Supreme Court has
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permitted states to televise court proceedings in some cir-
cumstances, the Court has never held that cameras must
be allowed into a state courtroom."66 Nichols, too, relied
on Chandler, focusing on a statement in the decision that
"4we reject the argument . . . that the First and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution mandate
entry of the electronic media into judicial proceedings."
6 7
Nichols also relied on various statements in Estes
68 that
access to judicial proceedings by print reporters does not
compel access for cameras; 6 9 on Nixon v. Warner
Communications,7 0 holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial did not require the trial to be broad-
cast; 7 1 and on the fact that Rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which prohibits the broadcasting
of federal criminal trials, has been upheld against consti-
tutional challenge.
72
Nichols did not confine his arguments to those based
purely on law. He also contended that televising pretrial
proceedings would unduly add to the pretrial publicity to
which he was already exposed, 73 saying that it "[would]
only make more toxic an already poisoned well,"
74 and
that "the trial [was] likely to feed tabloid and irresponsi-
ble media coverage of this case."
75
The electronic media submitted a brief in reply to
Nichols' arguments on March 8, 2000.76 In it, they con-
tended that Estes was an anachronism, a case which
even Justice Harlan's concur-
rence had recognized was prone
to obsolescence. 7 7 The electron-
ic media also discussed the dra-
matic change in technology
since Estes was decided:
Not only broadcast televi-
sion but cable television
has become pervasive in
our society; the rapid
development of the
Internet, the appearance of
interactive communications media, and the
convergence of all forms of media have greatly
altered how members of modern society
receive information and communicate with
each other. With C-SPAN, Court TV, CNN,
and public interest channels, among others,
the public has come to expect to see govern-
mental proceedings, including courts, on tele-
vision. Court TV has now televised hundreds
of judicial proceedings, including 'high-profile'
criminal cases, without disruption of the pro-
ceedings. 78
According to the media, such transformations had
been clearly recognized in recent judicial decisions such
as People v. Boss 79 (the murder case against four New
York police officers accused of gunning down an unarmed
immigrant, Amadou Diallo), holding unconstitutional NY
Civil Rights Law § 52, which had imposed a complete ban
on audio-visual coverage of court proceedings. The elec-
tronic media's reply also challenged the usefulness of
cases construing Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, saying those cases "are constructed of such
thin fabric as no longer to provide support for their con-
clusion."8 0 The reply also distinguished Nixon.
8 1
THE HEARING
Judge Murphy conducted a hearing on the motion on
March 10, 2000. The electronic media called three wit-
nesses; Nichols and the State of Oklahoma called none.
The petitioners' first witness, Tim Sullivan, Executive
Producer for Court TV, explained that since Court TV
began broadcasting in July 1991, it had covered over 700
trials and other proceedings in thirty-seven states, feder-
al courts, and several foreign countries. Sullivan himself
had been a reporter for Court TV, and had covered the
World Trade Center bombing case in New York, the
McVeigh and Nichols federal tri-
als in Denver, and the Branch
Davidian trial in San Antonio.
His producing credits included
the coverage of the impeachment
trial of President Clinton, the
hate-crime murder trial in
Jasper, Texas, and most recently
the Diallo murder case in
Albany, New York. Beyond his
own "personal" experiences,
Sullivan offered testimony
describing some of the "high-profile" cases which Court
TV had televised, including the Menendez brothers mur-
der case in California, the William Kennedy Smith trial
in Florida, the Louise Woodward ("Nanny") trial in
Boston, and, of course, the 0. J. Simpson case in Los
Angeles. 8 2
Sullivan explained how the courtroom would be set up
if television coverage of the Nichols case was allowed.
8 3
He described how the camera was operated, the function
of the sound board (e.g., microphones on the counsel
tables were turned down except when a lawyer at the
table addressed the court, and each of the counsel's
microphones had a "kill switch"), and how a "clean" sig-
nal8 4 would be distributed to other media in the "pool."
Sullivan identified Court TV's editorial guidelines and
explained how its production crew coordinates with the
judge to ensure that any concerns of the court or the par-
ties are addressed. He concluded his direct testimony
with opinions, based on his experience, that the presence
of a television camera did not disrupt the proceedings or
affect the performance of the participants, and that the
public benefitted from having a more complete and accu-
rate picture of what transpired in the courtroom than it
would get from reading or hearing about it from others.
In response to questioning from Nichol's counsel,
Sullivan conceded that the federal trials of McVeigh and
Nichols had not been televised and that Court TV had
not challenged the constitutionality of Rule 53 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.8 5 He addressed
concerns whether the microphones on the counsel tables
might inadvertently pick up communications between
lawyer and client.8 6 Sullivan disagreed with questions
suggesting that the riots in Los Angeles following the
verdict in the Rodney King beating trial resulted because
the trial was broadcast on television.
Questions from the Assistant District Attorney focused
on whether the wiring for the camera and microphones
and the camera operator were visible to trial participants
and spectators (suggesting their visibility would be dis-
tracting); whether private communications between
counsel could be overheard; and whether Court TV would
destroy any videotape which inadvertently recorded a
privileged communication between lawyer and client. 87
The two other witnesses called by the electronic
media were anchors for Oklahoma City television sta-
tions KFOR-TV (Linda Cavanaugh) and KWTV (Kelly
Ogle). Cavanaugh described the television medium as
powerful because it brings unfiltered images of an
event to the public. She explained that most people-
perhaps sixty to seventy percent-rely on television
news as their first medium of information, and that
television has become a fixture in almost all American
homes. Cavanaugh, who had covered the McVeigh
and Nichols trials in Denver for KFOR-TV, described
how television reporters covering a criminal proceed-
ing without a camera in the courtroom would have to
stand in front of the courthouse and repeat what
they heard inside. With pool television coverage,
flmitv
she said, reporters would "be able to show people the
trial as it is unfolding, [which] gives them a much more
accurate view because it goes from the courtroom to their
home, without this filter in the middle from the
reporter."
8 8
Cavanaugh disagreed with the suggestion from
Nichols' counsel that television news had become sensa-
tionalized. She also disagreed with his suggestion that
the public would not understand that a preliminary hear-
ing tends to be a one-sided event, and that a potential
jury pool would be prejudiced if the preliminary hearing
were televised. Cavanaugh pointed out that the infor-
mation would be in the public domain anyway, and that
it would be the responsibility of the electronic media to
make sure the public understood the context of the testi-
mony given in a preliminary hearing. Nichols' counsel
asked Cavanaugh a series of questions about the impact
of a television camera on witnesses-whether it would
discourage or otherwise affect testimony, or perhaps
allow sequestered witnesses to learn about the testimony
by others-but she declined to agree that there might be
such an adverse effect. In response to questions from the
Assistant District Attorney, Cavanaugh again testified
that a television camera in the courtroom would not
affect the performance of attorneys or witnesses. She
reiterated that televising the preliminary hearing would
not create more pretrial publicity that might affect
Nichols' fair trial rights: "We will be here every day
whether the cameras are in the courtroom or not."8 9
Cavanaugh also confirmed that the single video image
the media had of Nichols was a tape of his transfer from
the sally port of the jail, handcuffed, clad in a bullet-proof
vest, and surrounded by law enforcement authorities.
Cavanaugh replied no when Judge Murphy asked, "As a
viewer, does a person in handcuffs with a bullet proof
vest look like an innocent person?" 90 She said that the
media would prefer to have, and would use, tape of
Nichols sitting at counsel table in business dress- which
they would have if proceedings were televised-and that
image would contribute to the appearance of the pre-
sumption of innocence. Otherwise, she said, the media
will continue to use the only image of Nichols they have
in connection with virtually every story they do about
him.
Ogle, who like Cavanaugh covered the federal trials of
McVeigh and Nichols as a reporter and anchor, explained
why pictures are so important in television journalism:
We can use a thousand, two thousand words to
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try to describe a scene in a courtroom and try
to convey the emotion, the quality of the testi-
mony, the intent of the person giving it. But if
you can show them a picture and share with
them the sound, it can do far more than that.9 1
Ogle said that a better job of reporting was possible with
video from the courtroom, as opposed to mere interviews
of participants or even the reporter's own recounting of
what happened. To illustrate his point, Ogle presented
as evidence a videotape of two hypothetical news reports
about the Diallo case, one without and one with video-
tape from the trial.
92
Cross-examination of Ogle was similar to that of
Cavanaugh. Nichols' counsel asked whether televising
the preliminary hearing would not unfairly present one
side of the case to a large audience. Ogle replied in the
negative: "The Oklahoma viewer is pretty astute as to
what has happened in this case over the last five years.
I don't think we are going to plow any new ground with
them."9 3 The state's examination focused on whether the
choice of words and video can affect the perception of the
viewer. But in response to questions whether televising
the preliminary hearing would affect a great number of
Oklahomans, Ogle said that the hope of the electronic
media is not to affect the public but to inform them. Ogle
said he believed prospective members of a jury could put
aside what they heard, and that television coverage of
the preliminary hearing would not taint the jury pool.
Ogle concluded his testimony by answering questions
from Judge Murphy about the Diallo case. Ogle
expressed the view that the public had a greater appreci-
ation of the facts and circumstances of the case because
it was televised, and that members of the public were
able to make their own judgment about the facts in the
case because they were able to see the witnesses for
themselves.
The electronic media offered several exhibits to con-
clude the evidentiary presentation. 94 At the close of the
hearing, counsel presented short arguments to the court,
and answered questions from Judge Murphy. Once sat-
isfied, Judge Murphy adjourned, taking the electronic
media's motion under advisement.
9 5
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
On May 8, 2000, Judge Murphy conducted a hearing to
announce his decision granting the motion. He made
three findings: (1) The presence of a camera in the court-
room does not detract from the dignity of the proceed-
ings; (2) the presence of a camera in the courtroom does
not distract the parties or witnesses; and (3) the parties
act more professionally in the courtroom when a camera
is present. He then reached three legal conclusions: (1)
Canon 3(B)(9) violates both the state and federal consti-
tutions; (2) the Canon does not have the force of law; and
(3) the Canon improperly transfers discretionary author-
ity from the presiding judge to a criminal defendant. The
judge issued a 26-page opinion outlining his reasoning.
In addressing the constitutionality of Canon 3(B)(9),
Judge Murphy said the parties' invocation of the Canon
raised several issues. "First, the Canons generally are
regarded as advisory guidelines, not intended to create
substantive rights of the accused in a criminal proceed-
ing." Second, he expressed doubt that in adopting the
Canons the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which does not
hear appeals in criminal cases, intended to create such
substantive rights. Finally, even if the Canon was intend-
ed to create a "veto right" for a criminal defendant, it
could "pass constitutional muster" only "if the Canon
advanced a compelling state interest" and was "narrowly
tailored to serve that interest." "Even if the Canon does
not restrain constitutional rights," the court said, "it
would have to be rational to survive constitutional scruti-
ny."9 6
The court, referring to the First and Sixth
Amendments (and comparable provisions of the
Oklahoma Constitution), posed the question, "Do these
state and federal constitutional rights provide authority
for a presiding judge to allow cameras in the courtroom
over which he presides even in the face of an objection by
a defendant in a criminal proceeding?"9 7 To answer that
question, he said, one had to review the history of the
Code of Judicial Conduct from its origins in the ABA
Canons of Judicial Ethics and examine the rights of the
press to cover legal proceedings.
In doing so, the court found that the trial of Billie Sol
Estes in Texas in 1962 encouraged the ABA to maintain
the ban on cameras when the Code of Judicial Conduct
replaced the Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1972. However,
the Senate Watergate hearings in the early 1970's began
to alter the conventional wisdom that Estes imposed a
per se ban on cameras in criminal prosecutions. The
court summarized: "The hearings kept the American
public spellbound. Seeing the development of the evi-
dence in the logical pattern of a trial like setting and its
effect on the public led many courts to rethink the wis-
dom of the Estes decision."9 8
Although the ABA continued to oppose courtroom cam-
eras even after Watergate, state courts began to experi-
ment with live coverage of courtroom proceedings. For
instance, Florida's plan originally required the consent of
the participants, but that proved unworkable as few par-
ties consented. The requirement of consent was subse-
quently removed, and the decision to permit a camera
was left to the discretion of the judge. Florida's experi-
ment led to the decision in Chandler. According to Judge
Murphy, Chandler:
[R]emoved any confusion created in the after-
math of Estes. Accordingly, the ABA removed
Canon 3(A)(7) from the Code of Judicial
Conduct and inserted it as Standard 8.3.8 of
the Standards for Criminal Justice and of the
Standards for Fair Trial
and Free Press. This
standard adopts the neu-
tral position of Chandler
in leaving the matter to
the discretion of the pre-
siding judge.99
The court then discussed
the history of the Oklahoma
version of the Canon prohibit-
ing cameras in the courtroom.
In particular, Judge Murphy
focused on the impact of
les 100 where the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the use of a camera in
a criminal proceeding. In Lyles, the court stated that not
only had the presence of the camera failed to obstruct
any rights of the accused (either of privacy in the pro-
ceedings or freedom from extraneous influences on the
proceedings), but also it had salutary effects on the pro-
ceedings, opening them to public scrutiny of the officials
involved. The court put a great deal of emphasis on the
discussion in Lyles regarding the role of the presiding
judge in exercising proper control over the proceedings.
Judge Murphy found Nichols' argument that Lvles
was effectively overruled by the Supreme Court's adop-
tion of Canon 3(B)(9) "less than certain."10 1 But he nev-
ertheless concluded that whether Lyles was still good law
was not as important as the fact that "the wisdom of
Lyles is even greater today."10 2 That is, Lyles rejected
the oft-cited assumption that a camera in the courtroom
invariably distracted the participants and disrupted the
proceedings. According to Judge Murphy, "Moreover, the
filmitv
'anvil of experience' over the last [forty] years supports
Judge Brett's observations [in Lvles]. Of the more than
700 trials and other proceedings televised by Court TV
the appellate courts have yet to reverse a single case due
to the presence of a camera.
' 10 3
The court concluded its review of the Oklahoma situa-
tion by discussing briefly the experiment with cameras
authorized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1978, and
the revision of what was then Canon 3(A)(7), which reg-
ulated how cameras could be used. The court said that
the Oklahoma experiment "never got off the ground"
because the consent of the accused was required, and few
criminal defendants consented. 104 The court observed
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had recently repealed
the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted in 1975 and
replaced it with a new code
effective November 1, 1997, in





Canon 3(B)(9) did not have
the force of law. But he did so
for reasons other than those
suggested by the electronic
media. Judge Murphy's
approach was based on the
unusual division of appeal
responsibility between Oklahoma's appellate courts, the
Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals. 105 He
reasoned that if the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclu-
sive jurisdiction in criminal cases, and Lyles (which has
never been overruled) says that in criminal cases the pre-
siding judge has discretion to permit cameras, then the
Oklahoma Supreme Court could not adopt an adminis-
trative rule (such as Canon 3(B)(9), governing ethics)
which was contrary to the holding of the court which had
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases.
Finding comfort in several criminal appellate cases giv-
ing the presiding judge broad discretion in determining
the procedure to be followed in the courtroom, Judge
Murphy concluded that the presiding judge should have
"the authority to exercise final discretion in all discre-
tionary matters [including] the final decision on whether
broadcasting of proceedings degrades the proceedings or
works to deny the litigants a fair hearing." 10 6
Accordingly, he concluded that the Oklahoma Supreme
... ... . . .. ... ...
.. . .. .. 
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. .. . .. . . .. i?
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Court could not constitutionally transfer the determina- accused before a court could exercise its discretion to per-
tion whether a camera would be present in a criminal mit television coverage of a proceeding.
114 He ended his
proceeding from the presiding judge to the accused by decision by turning once again to Nichols' concerns that
adopting Canon 3(B)(9). Simply put, "[t]he Canon in television coverage would adversely impact him. Judge
question does not create a right of an accused to dictate Murphy said the short experimentation he had with a
to a presiding judge whether cameras may be allowed in camera during the March 10 hearing showed that it
the courtroom."10 7  added, rather than detracted, from the dignity of the pro-
The court then turned to a due ceedings.
115 And he rejected the
process analysis. Tracking the idea that televising the preliminary
arguments advanced by the elec- hearing would unfairly prejudice
tronic media, the court explored the defendant. The court said:
the Oklahoma constitutional provi- The issue raised by the motion
sions providing for open courts, of the [electronic media] is not
observing that Oklahoma follows whether this proceeding will
the mandate of Richmond generate publicity. It already
Newspapers. The court discussed has. The issue becomes
the benefits of open proceedings whether the public should be
and said that those proceedings limited to second hand sum-
can be closed or restricted only for maries of the news, prejudi-
compelling reasons. That being so, the court said, the
ability of the press to report on those proceedings was
important, because few members of the public had the
time or resources to attend. Judge Murphy rejected
Nichols' suggestion that televising the preliminary hear-
ing-often,"the prosecution's show"-would be prejudi-
cial to him. 10 8  The judge reflected again on the
Watergate experience, recalling that despite the "barrage
of adversarial pre-trial publicity," the principals were
"prosecuted in front of juries that satisfied both the trial
and appellate judges that they had no prejudicial predis-
positions."10 9  Judge Murphy noted, "[a]lthough the
instant case has already received a great amount of pub-
licity, it is hard to imagine how televising the orderly
legal proceedings could further prejudice the defen-
dant."1 10
Judge Murphy concluded his opinion with a compari-
son of the experiences of those jurisdictions where cam-
eras are permitted with those jurisdictions where they
are not. He found particularly persuasive the decision in
People v. Boss in New York, 11 1 and was not persuaded by
the ban in Mississippi upheld in Associated Press v.
Bost. 112 He commented that the hypothetical news
reports by Kelly Ogle "demonstrate [d] there was no ques-
tion but that the public can get a better feel of what hap-
pened in court when they can actually see the testimony
as opposed to hearing a reporter's version of what the tes-
timony was."11 3 The court noted that most states have
deleted any provision requiring the consent of the
cial inflammatory characterizations by inter-
ested third parties; or whether they will be
able to see for themselves what actually tran-
spires in the courtroom under the control of
the presiding judge. 116
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
OKLAHOMA COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS
The electronic media were understandably delighted
with Judge Murphy's decision. Of course, Nichols and
the State were not, and in the end, both parties
announced at the May 8 hearing that they would likely
seek extraordinary relief in an appellate court.117
Nichols did so on May 26, 2000, filing a writ applica-
tion in the Court of Criminal Appeals. 118 But he was
immediately faced with a problem: was the Court of
Criminal Appeals the right appellate court in which to
file? The case was a criminal prosecution, which would
normally be heard on appeal by the Court of Criminal
Appeals. But the basis on which Nichols had resisted a
camera in his courtroom proceeding, and the rule which
Judge Murphy had declared unconstitutional, was Canon
3(B)(9), a rule adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
Who had jurisdiction to hear the writ?
Nichols took a cautious approach to the issue, on
which there appeared to be no decisive authority. He
filed the writ application in the Court of Criminal
Appeals, but asked that court to "enter a stay of the
pending criminal proceedings and transfer the case to the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma to determine which court
should address this Petition." 119
The rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
govern procedures for extraordinary writs. 120 Rule 10.3
provides that no petition for extraordinary relief will be
heard without notice to the adverse party. Rule 10.4(A)
says that oral argument or a response to the petition may
be ordered by the court, or the court may remand the
petition to the district court for a hearing if necessary;
Rule 10.4(B) provides that the court may dismiss the
petition or decline to assume jurisdiction. No rule specif-
ically says that a petition for extraordinary relief may be
granted without an opportunity for the opposing party to
be heard. Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals
did just that.
The electronic media were stunned to learn on June 1,
2000, that the Court of Criminal Appeals had assumed
jurisdiction in the case and granted Nichols' writ appli-
cation. 12 1 The court vacated Judge Murphy's May 8
order allowing television coverage of Nichols' preliminary
hearing. The court did not, as Nichols had requested,
stay the proceedings and transfer the case to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The order granting petition was succinct. It declined
to address the validity of Judge Murphy's ruling invali-
dating Canon 3(B)(9), saying that jurisdiction to decide
the constitutionality of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
vested in the Oklahoma Supreme Court.1 22 It did, how-
ever, say that the Court of Criminal Appeals had the obli-
gation to "ensure due process in criminal proceed-
ings."12 3 To do so, the court said, it would grant extraor-
dinary relief because Nichols "has met the burden" for a
writ. 124
The remainder of the order granting petition is mysti-
fying. One might have expected the court to recognize
the respective interests protected by the First and Sixth
Amendments, and balance them in light of the evidence
presented in the March 10 hearing. 12 5 However, the
court's analysis began and nearly ended with the Sixth
Amendment. The court's stated premise was that a "pub-
lic trial" is a right belonging to the accused and not the
public, and its conclusion was that any "balance"
between private rights to a fair trial and the public right
of a free press had already been struck by Estes. The
Supreme Court, it said, had found that the use of television
"cannot be said to contribute materially to [the] objective of
a fair trial. Rather, its use amounts to the injection of an
filmitv
irrelevant factor into court proceedings."' 126 The court
concluded that the defendant's right to a fair trial takes
precedence over the interest of the electronic media in
televising a proceeding. Paying only slight homage to the
educative function of television, the court found little use
for it in a criminal proceeding:
At its best, it educates and informs. At its
worst, it has the potential for 'distorting the
integrity of the judicial process bearing on the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and more particularly, for casting
doubt on the reliability of the fact-finding
process carried on under such conditions.'1 2 7
Relying on Nixon, 12 8 the court determined that the
requirement of a public trial was satisfied by the oppor-
tunity of the public and press to attend the proceedings
and report what they observed. As for any argument that
the electronic media had a constitutional interest, the
court's answer was crisp and direct: "No constitutional
provision guarantees a right to televise trials."12 9 The
court's only reference to the First Amendment was the
observation that speech and press rights are subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. 13 0 The
court made no mention of Chandler or its own prior deci-
sion in Lyles, both of which had held that the presence of
a television camera did not violate the fair trial rights of
the accused.
The court concluded its order granting petition com-
paring federal and state constitutional provisions.
Recognizing that its discussion had relied "extensively
upon United States Supreme Court precedent in resolv-
ing the federal constitutional questions as . . . required .
• . under principles of federalism," the court remarked
that "as the court of last resort for criminal appeals in the
State of Oklahoma we are equally obligated to apply the
Oklahoma Constitution."13 1 But ultimately, the court
equated the rights of the accused to a fair trial 13 2 and the
rights of the press 13 3 under the Oklahoma Constitution
to those afforded by the federal constitution, saying that
"the issue before us presents the same clash of constitu-
tional rights as discussed above in our analysis of the fed-
eral constitutional claims."
13 4
"And we reach the same result," the court summarily
concluded. In the end, the message was simple: "We
specifically find that to televise or record a criminal trial
over the objection of a defendant would violate an
accused's right to due process of law as guaranteed by
Section 7, Article 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution."1 35
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THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT
The rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals prohibit
rehearing a decision on a writ application.
136 The elec-
tronic media thus faced what appeared to be a difficult
choice: accept the decision or petition the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari. The former was almost
unthinkable, because the electronic media strongly
believed that the Court of Criminal Appeals' analysis was
severely flawed, 137 and that the outcome was an obstacle
in the path of television coverage of court proceedings in
all jurisdictions. But while more palatable in some
respects, the latter option was impractical. Aside from
the cost, it was unlikely that a petition for certiorari
could be presented and acted upon before the pretrial
proceedings in State v. Nichols concluded, and the elec-
tronic media did not want to ask for the criminal prose-
cution to be stayed. Moreover, the order granting peti-
tion was not clearly grounded on federal, as opposed to
state, constitutional rights. Was there an independent
and adequate non-federal ground for the decision? Would
the Court even entertain a certiorari petition?
Challenged by this dilemma, the electronic media
opted to pursue a third course and petition the Oklahoma
Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ of certiorari.
After all, the basis for Judge Murphy's decision granting
the motion was the unconstitutionality of Canon 3(B)(9),
a Supreme Court-adopted rule, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals had declined to address that issue on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction to do so. In addi-
tion, the electronic media reasoned, the Court of
Criminal Appeals was flat wrong, and perhaps the
Oklahoma Supreme Court would wish to correct the obvi-
ous error. The Court of Criminal Appeals had granted
the writ without any opportunity for the electronic media
to respond to Nichols' writ application, it had ducked the
issue of the constitutionality of the Canon, and it had
adopted what appeared to be a per se ban on cameras in
a criminal proceeding, irrespective whether there was
any demonstrable risk of harm to the rights of the
accused, and in possible conflict not only with the weight
of precedent but also with the First Amendment. The
Court of Criminal Appeals was subject to the superven-
ing authority of the Supreme Court; maybe the highest
Court would do justice for the electronic media.
On June 5, 2000, four days after the Court of Criminal
Appeals had vacated Judge Murphy's decision, the elec-
tronic media filed their own petition for extraordinary
relief in the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 13 8 The media
application named as respondents the Court of Criminal
Appeals and the four judges who had joined in the order
granting petition.1 3 9
The media application recited the background facts
that the Court of Criminal Appeals had granted Nichols'
writ application without any chance for the electronic
media to respond; and that the Court of Criminal Appeals
had not done what Nichols requested-stay the proceed-
ings and transfer the writ application to the Supreme
Court to consider the constitutionality of Canon 3(B)(9)-
but had instead fashioned a per se rule that to televise a
criminal case over the objection of the accused violates
his due process rights under the state and federal consti-
tutions. 14 0 The media application asserted that the
Court of Criminal Appeals violated the constitutional
rights of the electronic media, contrary to Chandler.
14 1
Furthermore, it claimed that the Court of Criminal
Appeals had exceeded its jurisdiction by adopting a new
rule applicable in all criminal cases that was even more
restrictive than Canon 3(B)(9), thereby invading the
province of the Supreme Court to promulgate court rules;
that it had done so not only without evidentiary founda-
tion but also contrary to the only evidence in the record
before the appellate court; and that the rule adopted by
the Court of Criminal Appeals was itself unconstitution-
al. 14 2 The media application asked the Supreme Court to
assume jurisdiction, vacate the order granting petition
entered by the Court of Criminal Appeals, and either let
Judge Murphy's decision stand, or eliminate or revise
Canon 3(B)(9) to conform to the federal and state consti-
tutions and to reflect the evidence that "the mere pres-
ence of the modern broadcast media does not have an
inherently adverse impact on the criminal process."
1 43
On June 14, both Nichols 1 4 4 and the State of
Oklahoma 1 45 filed responses opposing the media applica-
tion. The arguments they made were familiar. Nichols
argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals alone had
jurisdiction to affirm or vacate Judge Murphy's decision
because it was given exclusive jurisdiction over criminal
cases. He said that the conclusions of the Court of
Criminal Appeals and Canon 3(B)(9) were "congruent,
not conflicting,"14 6 in that both prohibited television cov-
erage of a criminal proceeding without the consent of the
accused. Nichols reiterated that Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure also prohibited televised
federal criminal proceedings. 1 47 Finally, he argued that
Judge Murphy and the electronic media had glossed over
the risk to Nichols of pretrial publicity if the preliminary
hearing was televised. 148 Interestingly, Nichols, like the
Court of Criminal Appeals, avoided any reference to
Chandler or Lvles.
The State of Oklahoma presented similar arguments.
It stated that the Court of Criminal Appeals could
assume jurisdiction of Nichols' writ application because it
has exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases. It contended
that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not invade the
Supreme Court's rule-making province because it did not
decide the constitutionality of Canon 3(B)(9). 14 9 Unlike
Nichols, the State tried to address Chandler. 15 0
According to the State, Florida's rules on televised pro-
ceedings giving the presiding judge discretion to forbid
television coverage if it would have an adverse effect on
the accused were "time, place and manner restrictions..
. upheld by the Supreme Court as valid restrictions on
the media."15 1 The State said:
[Canon 3(B)(9)] sets out the same basic guide-
lines, with the exception that it grants a veto
right to the defendant .... Oklahoma does
not have an absolute ban on broadcast cover-
age of criminal trials. Oklahoma has a time,
place and manner restriction that allows a
defendant to make the choice determining
whether cameras will affect his fundamental
right to a fair trial.152
The State treated the Court of Criminal Appeals' order
granting petition as simply a determination that "with
respect to this case, to allow broadcast of these proceed-
ings would violate the defendant's right to a fair trial."15 3
The Court of Criminal Appeals did not leave it entirely to
the real parties in interest to represent its position as the
respondent in the Supreme Court. The four judges who
had participated in the order granting petition filed a
document entitled "Notice" on June 14. Although leaving
the duty of appearing at oral argument to the real parties
in interest, 154 the Court of Criminal Appeals neverthe-
less put its own spin on the order granting writ. The
Notice stated:
We do not dispute the constitutional authority
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court to determine
jurisdiction when there is a question as to
whether jurisdiction of a matter lies in the
Supreme Court or the Court of Criminal
Appeals. 15 5 In our order of June 1, 2000, this
Court sought to respect the constitutional pre-
rogative of the Oklahoma Supreme Court and
fim/tv
specifically refrained from engaging in any
analysis which would infringe on the jurisdic-
tion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
However, we recognized our responsibility and
authority to ensure due process was afforded a
criminal defendant in the State of Oklahoma
at all stages of the criminal process .... In
applying the constitutional provisions of due
process, this court limited its ruling to the
facts of the case as contained in the record and
presented to us for review. Our order speaks
for itself as to the adjudication of the issues. 
15 6
Oral argument was presented to a referee of the
Supreme Court on June 19, 2000.157 The Supreme Court
rendered its decision one week later. The Court said,
simply: "The application to assume original jurisdiction
is denied. Petitioners' motion for en banc oral argument
is denied."
15 8
ARE TV CAMERAS BANNED IN
OKLAHOMA CRIMINAL COURTS?
Despite the electronic media's motion, Canon 3(B)(9)
remains in effect, and there will be no television coverage
of Nichols' preliminary hearing. 1 5 9 But are cameras real-
ly banned in all Oklahoma criminal proceedings unless
the accused consents? The answer is hardly clear, and
questions abound.
Perhaps the most fundamental question is the one
that both the Court of Criminal Appeals and the
Oklahoma Supreme Court avoided: is Canon 3(B)(9) con-
stitutional? The order granting petition from the Court
of Criminal Appeals did not discuss Chandler, and the
court did not overrule its earlier case of Lyles. Thus, the
force of the arguments made by the electronic media-
that the assumptions in Estes about the disruptive effect
of the media on criminal proceedings are anachronistic in
light of modern technology, and that Chandler limited
the holding of Estes to the particular facts of that case-
remains unchallenged. But even Chandler did not hold
that television coverage was mandated under the First
Amendment. Will it take another Supreme Court case to
get to the next step of a presumptive right of the elec-
tronic media to cover court proceedings, or will it be left
to the states (perhaps, now, other than Oklahoma) to
progress to that point?
The order granting petition by the Court of Criminal
Appeals appears to create a blanket constitutional ban
on televised criminal proceedings without the consent of
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the accused: "We specifically find that to televise or
record a criminal trial over the objection of a defendant
would violate an accused's right to due process of law...
"160 But Chandler said that:
[A]n absolute constitutional ban on broadcast
coverage of trials cannot be justified simply
because there is a danger that, in some cases,
prejudicial broadcast accounts of pretrial and
trial events may impair the ability of jurors to
decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninflu-
enced by extraneous matter. The risk of juror
prejudice in some cases does not justify an
absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the
printed media; so also the risk of such preju-
dice does not warrant an absolute constitu-
tional ban on all broadcast coverage.161
Then is the order granting petition necessarily some-
thing less than an absolute constitutional ban, despite
the due process language used by the Court of Criminal
Appeals?
The Court of Criminal Appeals did not discuss any
facts reflected in the record of the hearing conducted by
Judge Murphy on March 10. Its decision was predicated
almost entirely on quotes from Estes. 16 2 Yet in its Notice
filed in the Supreme Court writ proceedings, the Court of
Criminal Appeals said its decision was "limited... to the
facts of the case as contained in the record."16 3 Is the
order granting petition based on Estes assumptions or
facts contained in record?
If it is the latter, another question arises: what facts?
Judge Murphy found on the evidence presented at the
hearing that there was no disruption of the proceedings,
that television coverage of the preliminary hearing would
not result in any more publicity than would be generated
by the media in any event, and that the coverage would
likely present a more accurate picture than would sec-
ond-hand accounts by reporters. Neither Nichols nor the
State of Oklahoma presented any evidence at the hear-
ing. If the Court of Criminal Appeals' order granting
petition was limited to the facts on the record, and all of
those facts appear to support the electronic media's posi-
tion, how was the opposite conclusion reached?
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not say why it was
declining to assume jurisdiction over the electronic
media's writ application. Did it believe that the Court of
Criminal Appeals' analysis was correct? Did it simply
believe that, right or wrong, the Court of Criminal
Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the mat-
ter, and the Supreme Court could not interfere? If the
Court of Criminal Appeals was wrong, either because
there were no facts of record to support its conclusion, or
because it imposed an absolute constitutional ban con-
trary to Chandler, how and when can the issue ever be
raised again?
And what if the Supreme Court decided to eliminate
the defendant-consent requirement in Canon 3(B)(9), or
even eliminate the Canon altogether? Would that action
override the Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling that the
presence of a television camera in a criminal proceeding
without the consent of the accused violates the defen-
dant's due process rights? Can the legislature permit
cameras in criminal proceedings by statute?
For now, there are no answers to these questions. The
immediate certainty is that absent Nichols' consent,
there will be no television coverage of his preliminary
hearing. There nevertheless remains reason to believe
that cameras will eventually be in Oklahoma courtrooms.
In this writer's view, that result is inevitable; the ques-
tion is not whether, but when. The movement to televi-
sion coverage will be driven by technology and the public,
not the bench and bar, but the legal community will even-
tually be dragged along and forced to concede the greater
value served by electronic coverage of judicial proceed-
ings.
The signs are there. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
has quietly initiated an experimental program of televi-
sion recording in the Fourth Judicial District (seated in
Kingfisher, a town of about 15,000 people less than fifty
miles northwest of Oklahoma City) under the supervi-
sion of Judge Susie Pritchett. Her courtroom contains
seven small digital cameras which can pan and zoom
remotely; the courtroom is wired with microphones.
Judge Pritchett is currently formulating rules for the use
of the cameras. For now, the cameras are intended to
provide backup to the stenographic reporter, not for
broadcast. However, the cameras are capable of provid-
ing a digital signal for broadcast, and one can surmise
that if the fear some judges express that participants in
judicial proceedings act differently in front of the camera
proves unfounded in Kingfisher County, as it undoubted-
ly will, it is but a small step to move from televising a
proceeding to make a record to televising a proceeding to
inform the public.
There will be cases in which the parties and other par-
ticipants consent to television coverage in Oklahoma.
And, certainly, the continuing experience of television
coverage in other jurisdictions will ultimately wear away
the last remnants of Estes. The decision of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in the Nichols case,
based as it is almost entirely on the skeleton of Estes,
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will likewise prove ephemeral. In the meantime, howev-
er, this peculiar case reveals another victim of the bomb-
ing-the public confidence in a judicial process observed
only indirectly.
1 Terry Lynn Nichols was convicted on federal charges of con-
spiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and eight counts of
involuntary manslaughter related to the deaths of eight feder-
al agents who were in the Murrah building. The federal jury
acquitted Nichols of using a weapon of mass destruction,
destruction by explosives, and eight counts each of first and sec-
ond-degree murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on
the conspiracy count and six years on each of the manslaughter
counts. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. U.S. v. Nichols, 169 F.3d
1255 (10th Cir. 1999). Timothy McVeigh was convicted of con-
spiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, use of a weapon of
mass destruction, destruction by explosives, and first degree
murder. His conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit. U.S. v McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).
The course of proceedings against McVeigh and Nichols can be
found in the plethora of reported decisions. See U.S. v. McVeigh,
157 F.3d 809 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's permit-
ting government disclosure of information to state authorities);
153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming McVeigh conviction);
119 F.3d 806 (10th Cir. 1997) (denying writ application of media
challenging district court's sealing of certain documents); 106
F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997) (dismissing government appeal of vic-
tim-impact witness sequestration); 964 F. Supp. 313 (D. Colo.
1997) (denying media motion to vacate or modify restrictions on
extrajudicial statements); 958 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1997)
(addressing rights of victims to attend proceedings even if they
might give victim impact testimony); 955 F. Supp. 1281 (D.
Colo. 1997) (denying McVeigh motion to dismiss indictment
because of allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity); 955 F. Supp.
1278 (D. Colo. 1997) (denying motion regarding admissibility of
laboratory tests); 954 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Colo. 1997) (denying
motions to suppress testimony and force disclosure of govern-
ment notes); 954 F. Supp. 1441 (D. Colo. 1997) (addressing
McVeigh's motions to compel discovery); 944 F. Supp. 1478 (D.
Colo. 1996) (upholding government's notice of intent to seek
death penalty); 940 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Colo. 1996) (denying
motions to dismiss certain counts of indictment); 940 F. Supp.
1541 (D. Colo. 1996) (denying motions to suppress evidence);
169 F.R.D. 362 (D. Colo. 1996) (granting motions for separate
trials of McVeigh and Nichols); 931 F. Supp. 756 (D. Colo.
1996) (restricting extrajudicial statements of participants in
proceedings); 931 F. Supp. 753 (D. Colo. 1996) (prohibiting pub-
lic distribution of audio tapes of court proceedings); 923 F.
Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1996) (addressing discovery issues and
government's duty of disclosure); 918 F. Supp. 1467 (W.D.
Okla. 1996) (changing venue from Western District of
Oklahoma to District of Colorado); 918 F. Supp. 1452 (W.D.
Okla. 1996) (denying media groups access to sealed docu-
ments, but establishing guidelines for sealing); 896 F.Supp.
1549 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (directing McVeigh to give handwrit-
ing exemplars to grand jury); and U.S. v. Nichols, 184 F.3d
1169 (10th Cir. 1999) (awarding attorneys' fees and expens-
es); 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming Nichols' convic-
tion); 67 F. Supp.2d 1198 (D. Colo. 1999) (denying motion for
new trial); 897 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (denying
motion for pretrial release). See also Nichols v. Reno, 931 F.
Supp. 748 (D. Colo. 1996) (challenging government's notice of
intent to seek death penalty).
2 The N.Y TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, (quoting Macy at a press con-
ference announcing the filing of state charges).
3 In a pool situation, the representative of the media which is
providing coverage shares the print or broadcast information
with other members of the media. Pool coverage limits the
number of media present in the courtroom without limiting the
ability of all media to report on the event.
4 The consortium included Courtroom Television Network LLC
(Court TV), The New York Times Company, for itself and its
division KFOR-TV (Channel 4, Oklahoma City),
Ohio/Oklahoma Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc., (KOCO-TV,
Channel 5, Oklahoma City), KOTV, Inc. (Channel 6, Tulsa),
KTUL, L.L.C. (Channel 8, Tulsa), and Griffin Television, L.L.C.
(KWTV, Channel 9, Oklahoma City). Later, Scripps Howard
Broadcasting, d/b/a KJRH-TV (Channel 2, Tulsa) joined the
consortium. In this article, this group of television broadcasters
will be referred to as "the electronic media."
5 Motion to Allow Use of Television Camera in the Courtroom,
and Supporting Brief, State v. Nichols, No. CF-99-01845 (Okla.
Dist. Ct. 2000) [hereinafter "Motion"].
6 The regulation of electronic media access to court proceedings
in Oklahoma is contained in the Code of Judicial Conduct
adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Code is codified
at OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, Ch. 1, App. 4. The latest version, in effect
at the time of the electronic media's motion, can be found elec-
tronically on the Oklahoma Supreme Court Network
(http://www.oscn.net) as 1997 OK 79.
7 Motion, supra note 5, at 1-2.
8 Id. at 2.
9 Id. at 2-3. It was noted in the Motion that the court had
entered a gag order on the participants in the proceedings at
their request, as a result of which little of the public informa-
tion would come from those most directly involved; what the
public knew would come only through the filtered reports of the
few public observers.
10 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980).
11 The Motion argued: "Openness of criminal proceedings is 'no
quirk of history; rather, it has long been recognized as an indis-
pensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial. [Early commen-
tators] saw the importance of openness to the proper function-
ing of a trial; it gave assurance that the proceedings were con-
ducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury,' the.
misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias
or partiality.' Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at569. Stated
another way, 'a trial courtroom also is a public place where the
people generally-and representatives of the media have a
right to be present, and where their presence historically has
been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes
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place.' Id. at 556. It is widely acknowledged that public trials
have significant 'community therapeutic value,' id at 570, espe-
cially when a shocking crime occurs; and both process and out-
come need to be public if the trial is to serve its prophylactic
purpose. '[W]here the trial has been concealed from public view
an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at
best has failed and at worst has been corrupted .... People in
an open society do not demand infallibility from their institu-
tions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are pro-
hibited from observing.' Id. at 571-572."
12 After Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, and Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.S.
596 (1982), which dealt with criminal trials, the Court expand-
ed the presumption of openness to trial voir dire in Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501
(1984)(Press-Enterprise I) and then to preliminary hearings in
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1
(1986)(Press-Enterprise II).
13 Motion, supra note 5, at 6 (quoting United States v. Antar,
38 F.3d 1348, 1360 (3rd Cir. 1994)). In United States v. Criden,
648 F.2d 814, 822 (3rd Cir. 1981), the court said: "Thus, the pub-
lic forum values emphasized in [Richmond Newspapers] can be
fully vindicated only if the opportunity for personal observation
is extended to persons other than those few who can manage to
attend the trial in person."
14 Motion, supra note 5, at 6 (internal citations omitted).
15 Motion, supra note 5, at 7 (internal citations omitted). In a
footnote, the electronic media invited the court's attention to In
re Clear Channel Communications, Inc. (N.Y Sup. Ct., Mar. 3,
1999, Rosen, J.) ("This court can hardly envision any serious
argument that a rational basis can be crafted to justify what
appears to be clear discrimination against the electronic media
[in prohibiting broadcasts of judicial proceedings]."), quoted in
People v. Boss, 2000 WL 136826 (N.Y Sup. Ct., Jan. 25, 2000,
Teresi, J.).
16 See Lyles v. State, 1958 OK CR 79, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1958).
17 Id. at 739. The court said: "Basically, there is no sound rea-
son why photographers and television representatives should
not be entitled to the same privileges of the courtroom as other
members of the press. Certainly there is much force in the
Chinese proverb, one picture is worth a thousand words." Id. at
741.
18 Motion, supra note 5, at 9.
19 Canon 3(B)(9) provides:
Except as permitted by the individual judge, the use of cam-
eras, television or other recording or broadcasting equipment is
prohibited in a courtroom or in the immediate vicinity of a
courtroom.
(a) Before cameras, television or other recordings or
broadcasting equipment are used, express permission of the
judge must be obtained.
(d) No witness, juror or party who expresses any objection
to the judge shall be photographed nor shall the testimony of
such witness, juror or party be broadcast or telecast.
(e) There shall be no photographing or broadcasting of:
(1) any proceeding which under the laws of this State
are required to be held in private; or
(2) any portion of any criminal proceedings until the
issues have been submitted to the jury for determination unless
all accused persons who are then on trial shall have affirma-
tively, on the record, given their consent to the photographing or
broadcasting.
20 Motion, supra note 5, at 10-11.
21 See L. Handman and A. Liptak, Media Coverage of Trials of
the Century, 26 LITIGATION 35, 38 (Fall 1999) ("According to A.
Scott Berg, whose biography of Lindbergh won the Pulitzer
Prize, as a result of their 'ability to sway emotion in the
Lindbergh case--both in the performances they encouraged
and in the reactions they could manipulate outside the court-
room-cameras were banned from virtually every trial in
America for the next sixty years."').
22 See R. GOLDFARB, TV OR NOT TV: TELEVISION, JUSTICE, AND
THE COURTS (New York University Press 1998).
23 62 ABA Rep. 1134-35 (1937).
24 Richard Kielbowicz, The Story Behind the Adoption of the
Ban on Courtroom Cameras, 63 JUDICATURE 14, 15 (1979).
25 E. Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 56-
59 (1973), cited in Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 563 (1981).
26 See "News Media Coverage of Judicial Proceedings (1998)"
published by the Radio-Television News Directors Association
("RTNDA'), at 3.
27 Id.
28 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, Ch. 1, App. 4 (1961).
29 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, Ch. 1, App. 4 (1991).
30 See 49 Okla. B.J. 2150. "A judge may permit broadcasting,
televising, recording and taking photographs in the courtroom
during sessions of the court, including recesses between ses-
sion, under the following conditions: . . ." Some of the back-
ground of the change in Canon 3(A)(7) is discussed in the Letter
to the Editor of the Oklahoma Bar Journal from Ernest J.
Schultz, then Director of Information at KTVY (KFOR's prede-
cessor) and President of RTNDA. See 49 Okla. B.J. 1241.
31 See 53 Okla. B.J. 584.
32 See Donna Kelly Broyles, New Rules for Open Courts:
Progress or Empty Promise, 18 TULSA L. J. 147 (1982) (explor-
ing the issue of cameras in the courtroom under Canon 3(A)(7),
and recommending that requirements of participant consent be
eliminated).
33 In re Amendments to the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1997 OK
79.
34 Motion, supra note 5, at 14.
35 See Chandler, 449 U.S. 560.
36 Id. at 578-579.
37 Motion, supra note 5, at 15.
38 Id. at 21.
39 Report of the Chief Administrative Judge to the Legislature,
the Governor, and the Chief Judge of the State of New York on
the Effect of Audio-Visual Coverage on the Conduct of Judicial
Proceedings (March 1989) ("Rosenblatt Report"). Judge
Rosenblatt commented that "[t]he evils of the Lindberg case are
safely behind us, at least so far as the courtroom is concerned.
. The best argument against a noisy courtroom is a quiet cam-
era and a good judge. We have plenty of both." Rosenblatt
Report at 106.
40 Report of the Committee on Audio-Visual Coverage of Court
Proceedings (May 1994) ("Roberts Report"). The Roberts
Committee adopted numerous methods designed to account for
and test any concerns raised by opponents of televised proceed-
ings. Specifically, it solicited observations of trial judges who
presided over proceedings in which audio-visual coverage was
permitted; it solicited complaints from members of the
Criminal Justice Section of the Bar Association and from the
New York State District Attorneys' Association; it compiled and
analyzed data from all applications for television coverage; it
reviewed and analyzed prior studies from New York and other
jurisdictions; it conducted two public hearings, at which 46 wit-
nesses testified, and it reviewed written submissions prepared
by other organizations and individuals who did not testify; and
it met as a group on several occasions to discuss and debate the
issue relating to cameras in the courtroom.
4 1 An Open Courtroom: Cameras in the New York Courts: 1995-
1997 (April 1997) ("Feerick Report").
42 Id. at 76. The committee said: "Although televised coverage
could, at times, show the judicial system in an unfavorable
light, we do not view that as a detriment. Rather, to the extent
that such coverage offers an opportunity for improving the judi-
cial system, we view it as a strength of our democratic system."
Id. at 78.
43 Id. at 74.
44 Evaluation of California's Experiment with Extended Media
Coverage of Courts (September 1981) ("Short Report").
45 Task Force on Photographing, Recording and Broadcasting
in the Courtroom, California Administrative Office of the
Courts Report Summary (February 16, 1996).
46 Id. at 10
47 Id. at 7. Interestingly, among all judge respondents, fifty-five
percent preferred that video cameras be banned from the court-
room; sixty-three percent believed that cameras impaired judi-
cial dignity and courtroom decorum; and seventy percent
thought video broadcast media in the court had a negative
impact on the fair trial rights of the parties. Id. These statis-
tics strongly suggest that almost all judicial opposition to cam-
eras in the courtroom comes from judges who have no experi-
ence with cameras, and react to the issue of cameras on a vis-
ceral rather than experiential basis.
48 Task Force on Photographing, Recording and Broadcasting
in the Courtroom, California Administrative Office of the
Courts Report Summary (May 10, 1996).
fiImitv
49 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, reh. denied, 382 U.S. 875
(1965).
50 Id. at 536.
51 Id. at 538.
52 Motion, supra note 5, at 23, quoting Chandler, 449 U.S. at
574.
53 See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575.
54 Id. at 575-581.
55 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 595-596.
56 Motion, supra note 5, at 24.
57 See. e.g. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 942 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. N.Y
1996); Marisol, A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. N.Y 1996);
Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 923 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.
N.Y 1996); People v. Boss, 2000 WL 136826 (N.Y Sup. Ct.
2000); Cook v. First Morris Bank, 719 A.2d 724, 27 Med. L.
Rptr. 1090 (N.J. 1998); Sunbeam Television Corp. v. State, 723
So. 2d 275, 26 Med. L. Rptr. 2553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
WFTV, Inc. v. Florida, 704 So. 2d 188, 26 Med. L. Rptr. 1862
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); In re Times-World Corp., 488 S.E.2d
677, 26 Med. L. Rptr. 1330 (Va. Ct. App. 1997); Duff v. Basilica
of Saint John 26 Med. L. Rptr. 1156 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1997); The
Hearst Corp. dlb/a WCVB-TV Channel 5 v. Justices of the
Superior Court, 24 Med. L. Rptr. 1478 (Mass. 1996); State v.
Haveood, 23 Med. L. Rptr. 1636 (N.Y 1995).
58 Motion, supra note 5, at 25-26.
59 Motion, supra note 5, at 26. The electronic media noted that
Nichols had contended in motions then pending before the trial
court that the extensive coverage of the bombing, the investi-
gation by authorities, and the federal prosecutions of McVeigh
and Nichols had already so prejudiced the citizens of Oklahoma
that he could not get a fair trial anywhere. The electronic media
argued that if the reporting has been so extensive as to make
that argument plausible, then any additional prejudice alleged-
ly resulting from the television coverage of the preliminary pro-
ceedings would be de minimus.
60 The electronic media said in a footnote to their argument:
"In-court cameras do not cause out-of-court reporting; they only
capture what actually happens in court and nothing more. The
question is therefore not whether cameras in the courtroom in
this case will generate publicity, but whether the defendant
should have the power to decide unilaterally (with or without
reason) if the public will receive its information about this trial
solely from second-hand summaries on the news or whether it
will be permitted, as it has a right to do, to observe itself the
entirety of the actual in-court proceedings, dignified, somber,
and under the control of the court." As Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy stated in testimony to Congress:
You can make the argument that the most rational,
the most dispassionate, the most orderly presenta-
tion of the issue is in the courtroom and it is the out-
side coverage that is really the problem. In a way,
it seems somewhat perverse to exclude television
from the area in which the most orderly presenta-
tion of the evidence takes place.
Hearings before a subcommittee of the House
R BE , D. N .o
Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Second
Sess. 30 (1996). Moreover, the defendant should
hardly be heard to object. At present, the images of
the accused normally seen on television-dressed in
an orange jumpsuit, wearing a flak jacket, and sur-
rounded by FBI agents--come from file footage
taken when he was first accused by federal author-
ities. To show the defendant in the courtroom,
dressed in a pin-striped shirt and sport coat or sim-
ilar street clothing, assisting his counsel at the
table, is arguably a much-improved image to which
he ought to have no objection." Motion, supra note
5, at 26 n.22.
61 Motion, supra note 5, at 27-28, citing Press-Enterprise I, 464
U.S. at 510; Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 608.
62 Motion, supra note 5, at 28. A few days after the electronic
media filed their Motion, The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press and the Radio-Television News Directors
Association submitted letters to the court supporting the
Motion.
63 Nichols' 16-page Response and Opposition to Media's Motion
to Allow Use of Television Cameras in the Courtroom, State v.
Nichols, No. CF-99-01845 (Okla. Dist. Ct. 2000) [hereinafter
"Nichols' Response"]. The State of Oklahoma had filed a two-
page objection to KFOR-TV and KWTV's motion to televise the
arraignment on February 1, 2000. It did not file a separate brief
in response to the Motion, but the Assistant District Attorneys
responsible for the Nichols prosecution made it clear in person-
al appearances before the trial court that they did not want to
be on television, and that the State objected to the Motion on
the same grounds stated in their earlier submission.
64 Nichols first challenged the electronic media's standing to
file its motion, on the ground that they had not intervened in
the proceeding.
65 Nichols argued that "this Court does not have discretion to
ignore the Judicial Code" and that the Code of Judicial Conduct
"provides for potential discipline of judges." Nichols' Response,
supra note 63, at 3. This response was directed primarily at the
electronic media's passing mention (Motion at 27) that two
cases-Nix v. Standing Committee on Jud. Perform. of Okla.
Bar Ass'n, 1966 OK 264, 422 P.2d 203, and Lyles v. State, 1958
OK CR 79, 330 P.2d 734, both of which were decided prior to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's adoption of Canon 3(B)(9)-
described the former Code of Judicial Conduct as "of persuasive
force only and not mandatory," Nix, 422 P.2d at 207, or as not
having the force of law, Lyles, 330 P.2d at 736.
66 Nichols' Response, supra note 63, at 8.
67 Id. at 9, quoting Chandler, 449 U.S. at 569 (quoting Florida
Supreme Court's opinion).
68 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.
69 Nichols' Response, supra note 63, at 10.
70 See Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
71 Nichols' Response, supra note 63, at 9-10.
72 Id. at 10-13, citing U.S. v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir.
1983), and cases following Hastings: Conway v. U.S., 852 F.2d
187 (6th Cir. 1988)(per curiam); U.S. v. Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293
(5th Cir. 1986)(per curiam); U.S. v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617 (7th
Cir. 1984). Nichols also cited Associated Press v. Bost, 656 So.2d
113 (Miss. 1995), and U.S. v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 753 (D.
Colo. 1996)(refusing press access to audio recordings of pro-
ceedings used as backup for court reporter on ground that
recordings were "functional equivalent" of broadcast prohibited
by Rule 53).
73 Nichols' Response did not contain any exhibits. However,
Nichols had motions pending before the court which asserted he
could not get a fair trial anywhere in Oklahoma in light of the
adverse pretrial publicity. He had also subpoenaed all newspa-
pers and television and radio stations in Oklahoma to obtain
everything they had published or broadcast about the
Oklahoma City bombing since April 19, 1995. After a hearing on
March 3, 2000, the trial court refused to compel the production
of the subpoenaed material, in part because much of the mate-
rial was available online or was archived at the Oklahoma
Historical Society.
74 Nichols' Response, supra note 63, at 15. Nichols said: "Even
if we accept the position that television does not inherently cor-
rupt the trial process, this is not the case for experimentation.
It is the most passionately charged case in the State's history. .
• As judges and commentators have noted, there are differences
between televising an ordinary criminal trial and televising a
'trial of the century.' While it may be true that in an ordinary
case, jurors may not be affected by the presence of television
cameras, this is not the ordinary trial. It is inconceivable that
anyone could conclude that cameras would have no effect on a
witness who knew his or her testimony was about to be watched
by hundreds of thousands of his or her fellow Oklahomans...
Attorneys may be affected as well. The participants in this case
have plenty to worry about without having to think about how
they look on national television." Id. at 15-16.
75 Nichols' Response. supra note 63, at 16. To avoid a direct
slap at Court TV, Nichols said: "Even if Court TV is completely
responsible, it will be supplying sound bites for responsible and
irresponsible media alike." Id.
76 Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Allow Use of Television
Camera in the Courtroom, State v. Nichols, No CF-99-01845
(Okla. Dist. Ct. 2000) [hereinafter "Reply Brief']. As for Nichols'
argument that they lacked standing for not having intervened
in the case, the electronic media noted that the Supreme Court
had said the media must be given meaningful opportunity to be
heard on any issue of limiting their right of access, citing Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.25 (1982);
and that they were aware of no case requiring intervention to
do so. In any event, they said, they would seek leave to inter-
vene if the court felt that was necessary.
77 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 595-96.
78 Reply Brief, supra note 76, at 4.
79 See People v. Boss, 701 N.YS.2d 891 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
80 Reply Brief, supra note 76, at 6. The electronic media argued
that U.S. v. Hastings, which was the first case to uphold Rule
53, considered no empirical data and relied solely on Estes; and
that the subsequent cases cited by Nichols-Conway v. U.S.,
U.S. v. Edwards, and U.S. v. Kerley-rlied primarily on Estes
and Hastings. The Reply Brief concluded: "Thus, the entire
body of case law relied on by the defendant to defend the con-
stitutionality of Rule 53-and by implication, the constitution-
ality of Canon 3(B)(9)-is constructed on the foundation of
Estes, does not consider any empirical data to support its analy-
sis, and arrives at a common conclusion based, at bottom, on the
speculative fears about televised trials of judges who have never
experienced a trial before a television camera." Reply Brief,
supra note 76, at 7.
81 Reply Brief, supra note 76, at 8. The reply observed that the
issue in Nixon was whether the media were entitled to access to
audio tapes of conversations recorded by President Nixon which
had been admitted into evidence in criminal trials of other
Watergate defendants. As the Court said in Nixon, "the issue
presented in this case is not whether the press must be permit-
ted access to public information to which the public generally is
guaranteed access, but whether these copies of the White
House tapes-to which the public has never had physical
access-must be made available for copying." Nixon, 435 U.S.
at 609 (emphasis by Court). Nixon was therefore distinguish-
able, the electronic media said, because they were not asking
for access superior to what the public enjoys. They asked only
that, as the eyes and ears of the public, they be permitted to
transmit to the extended public-those persons who do not
have the means or resources to attend these proceedings in per-
son-the same images and sounds that the person in the court-
room could see and hear. The reply observed further that in
Nixon (a case decided before Richmond Newspapers opened
access to courts on First Amendment grounds), the Court's First
Amendment analysis was based on access to documents, not
access to the courtroom; and its analysis of the media's argu-
ment that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial
required release of copies of the tapes was limited, with conclu-
sory statements about the Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial based on citations to Estes.
82 Sullivan said Court TV had even televised one criminal trial
in Oklahoma in 1991.
83 Judge Murphy had earlier granted the request of the elec-
tronic media to conduct a demonstration of television coverage,
provided that Nichols would not be shown. The night before the
hearing on March 10, the technical crew from Court TV set up
a single Beta camera on a swivel just outside the bar in the
courtroom; placed microphones at strategic locations on the
bench, counsel table, witness stand, and attorney's podium; and
put a large monitor in the front of the courtroom and a small
monitor on the bench. Wiring was taped to the floor so as to be
unobtrusive, and cable was run to an adjacent room where the
producer and sound engineer were located. The demonstration
was "closed circuit;" that is, no signal was sent out of the court-
room. Only the Court TV technical crew and those in the court-
room could see what was on the television screen. A portion of
the hearing was videotaped for the appellate record; the tape
was ordered sealed.
84 An unedited signal is carried to a satellite truck and distri-
bution box outside the building. Any media wishing to receive
the signal can plug into the box and either transmit the signal
directly on its own channel or network or tape the feed for later
editing or broadcast.
85 Sullivan later said that Court TV had challenged the consti-
tutionality of New York's ban on television coverage of trials in
People v. Boss (the Diallo case), and had succeeded in having
the ban declared unconstitutional.
flimtv
86 Sullivan said that there had been only one previous instance
of which he was aware that a confidential conversation had
been overheard; that the kill switch would eliminate that risk;
and that, in any event, the microphones on counsel tables could
be removed without seriously affecting the quality of audio pro-
duction from the courtroom if counsel insisted.
87 Judge Murphy had several questions for Sullivan about the
use of a monitor by the court, and he asked why there were
times when witnesses or counsel could not be heard well during
Court TV's coverage of the Diallo case. (Sullivan explained that
the judge had limited the number of microphones in the court-
room until he became aware that there were "dead spots.")
88 Transcript of Motion Hearing, Vol. II, at 10.
89 Id. at 39.
90 Id. at 49.
91 Id. at 57.
92 The hypothetical report covered the emotional testimony of
one of the officers accused of murder. The officer was describing
his reaction when he approached the body of Amadou Diallo
and realized that the man was unarmed.
93 ranscript of Motion Hearing, Vol. II, at 65.
94 Those exhibits were excerpts from the American Bar
Association Journal (former President Phillip Anderson's edito-
rial views in favor of cameras in the courtroom) and an editori-
al and two articles from Judicature, a publication of the
American Judicature Society, which is interested in the effi-
cient administration of justice, about the issue of cameras in
the courtroom.
95 On March 14, 2000 the electronic media sent a letter to
Judge Murphy with additional authority in response to ques-
tions the court had asked at the end of the hearing. In particu-
lar, the electronic media explained why they believed a trial
court could declare unconstitutional a Canon of judicial ethics
adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court (it could do so, they
said, because the Canon was adopted in the Court's legislative
rather than adjudicative function, rules adopted by the
Supreme Court had to conform to the constitution, and a trial
court had the power to declare legislative acts unconstitution-
al). The letter challenged the wisdom of Associated Press v.
Bost, 656 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1995), a case which had upheld a ban
on courtroom cameras in that state. And it distinguished two
cases from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Brennan
v. State, 1988 OK CR 297, 766 P.2d 1385, and Kennedy v. State,
1982 OK CR 11, 640 P.2d 971, which had touched on the issue
of cameras in the courtroom.
96 State v. Nichols, No. CF-99-01845 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 8,
2000), <http://www.oscn.net> [hereinafter, "the Decision"].
97 Decision, supra note 96, at 6.
98 Id. at 8.
99 Id. at 9.
100 See Lvles, 330 P.2d 734.
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101 Decision, supra note 96, at 12. The court referred to foot-
note 38 in Estes v. Texas, in which Justice Clark for the major-
ity described the Oklahoma situation as "unclear," because the
Canon was adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the
midst of cases decided by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals which left the televising of criminal proceedings to the
discretion of the trial judge. Justice Clark cited Lyles (pre-
Canon)and Cody v. State, 361 P.2d 307 (1961)(post-Canon).
102 Decision, supra note 96, at 12.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 13. The court said: "The most notable exception is
Roger Dale Stafford who received death sentences for two sep-
arate multiple murders and was ultimately executed. [State v.
Stafford, 1983 OK CR 86, 665 P.2d 1205, and 1993 OK CR 23,
853 P.2d 223] Perhaps his experience with cameras in the court-
room had a chilling effect on the willingness of any other crim-
inal defendants to grant such consent. Others who consented
were Gene Leroy Hart (acquitted of Girl Scout murders) and
Glen Ake. [Ake v. State, 1983 OK CR 48, 663 P.2d 1, rev'd, Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, after remand, 1989 OK CR 30, 778
P.2d 460] Now only two states that allow the televising of crim-
inal proceedings require the consent of the accused, that being
Oklahoma and Alabama."
105 According to article VII, § 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court is the only "constitutional" court.
It is given supervening authority over all inferior courts, includ-
ing the Court of Criminal Appeals. However, § 6 provides that
until determined otherwise by the legislature, the Court of
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